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1 Introduction
Over the last decade political economy literature has focused on the impact that po-
litical institutions have on economic policies (Persson, 2002). The seminal work of
Persson and Tabellini (2003) has shown that institutions, namely political regimes,
matter in shaping size and composition of government spending. Since these findings,
a wealth of literature (e.g. Blume et al., 2009) has highlighted how those results are
not robust to changes such as, for example, the set of countries and the time span.
Furthermore, some authors (e.g. Acemoglu, 2005; Voigt, 2011) have suggested that the
distinction between parliamentary and presidential systems may simply be too coarse
and that possible extensions include the use of more fine grained variables to classify
constitutional systems.
The purpose of this paper is to better analyse the dichotomy between presidential
and parliamentary regimes. In particular, we consider the presence and the effective use
of the confidence vote as the key variable to distinguish parliamentary from presidential
systems.1 This specific constitutional feature operates through different mechanisms
that may also depend on several underlying aspects of the political environment. In
some cases, the confidence vote does indeed generate frequent changes of government,
thus replacing possibly bad politicians and generating a different government composi-
tion (selection effect). In other countries, the confidence vote acts as a credible threat
and may induce either the executive to behave better (disciplining effect) or the par-
liament to accept more frequently the executive’s misbehaviour (legislative cohesion).
Hence, the performance of parliamentary systems may depend on politicians’ char-
acteristics such as, for example, the quality of the information available and/or the
alignment of their interests with the citizens’ interests (Lindberg, 2012). Given this
complexity, we investigate more deeply the characteristics of countries that adopt a
parliamentary constitution by considering the stability of governments as a proxy to
distinguish different parliamentary systems (Lijphart, 2004). We measure stability as
inversely related to the frequency of government changes, which is clearly correlated
with the effective use of the confidence vote.
The issue is to understand if institutions and their actual enactment, picked up by
our finer partition of political regimes, do matter in terms of implemented policies. The
main result of this paper is that this classification of constitutional systems (presiden-
tial, stable parliamentary, unstable parliamentary) delivers more robust results than
those in the literature. In detail, we find that stable parliamentary systems are signifi-
cantly different from both presidential and unstable parliamentary systems. In contrast,
unstable parliamentary systems and presidential systems behave alike in terms of the
policy they implement. This result is robust to changes in the set of countries included
in the dataset and in the definition of stability.
1For a detailed review of the relevance of the confidence vote, see Lijphart (1999).
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Hence, we contribute to the literature by refining the standard classification of consti-
tutions (see Persson and Tabellini, 2003) introducing stable and unstable parliamentary
systems. In Persson and Tabellini (2003), the authors compare constitutional systems
- presidentialism vs. parliamentarism - and electoral rules - majoritarian vs. propor-
tional - in order to identify the differences, if any, in a number of relevant social and
economic indicators.2
Extensive literature followed Persson and Tabellini (2003), with the aim of extending,
testing or questioning their results. First, Blume et al. (2009) find that, while the
results on the effect of the electoral rules are robust, the effects of the parliamentary
vs. presidential constitutional choice are sensitive to an enlargement of the dataset and
the updating of the economic indicators used as regressors.
Over time the profession has felt the need for an extension of the Persson and
Tabellini analysis. Acemoglu (2005) and Voigt (2011), among others, question the
presidential/parliamentary classification of constitutional structure in a twofold man-
ner: on the one hand they advocate the endogenous nature of the constitutional form
of government, noting that it is an equilibrium outcome rather than an exogenous
characteristic, on the other hand they ask for a finer partition of countries, taking into
account the heterogeneity within each group. Moreover Voigt (2011) highlights the lack
of an analysis of possible transmission channels. While recent works, such as Robin-
son and Torvik (2008) and Hayo and Voigt (2013), investigate the determinants of the
choice or change of the constitutional structure, not much has been done to refine the
classification of constitutional structures when studying their effect on policy.3
In Section 2 we suggest how our findings may be explained by two effects that are
consistent with previous theoretical literature: a selection effect, as in Cella et al.
(2015), and a legislative cohesion effect, as in Baron (1998), Diermeier and Feddersen
(1998a, 1998b) and Diermeier and Vlaicu (2011). Section 3 presents the data and the
model, Section 4 discusses the results and Section 5 concludes.
2 Theoretical background
The idea that further partitioning parliamentary systems may provide insights into the
link between institutions and economic policy finds its support in several theoretical
papers. In fact while the interplay of uncertainty and incentives operates unambigu-
2Persson and Tabellini identify presidential/parliamentary regimes according to the legal existence of
the confidence vote, so that presidential countries where the government is subject to a confidence
vote - as for instance France - are classified as parliamentary. The authors find that presidential
systems systematically spend the five percent less than parliamentary systems.
3An exception is the work of Ardanaz and Scartascini (2014) who sustain that the degree of separation
of power within presidential systems is heterogeneous. They replicate the analysis of Persson and
Tabellini (2003) but interacting presidential systems with a dummy indicating the executive budget
discretion. They find that presidentialism has a larger negative impact on government size only
when executive discretion regarding budget allocation is low.
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ously in presidential systems and generally gives rise to unique equilibria, parliamentary
systems are more heterogeneous and can support multiple equilibrium strategies and
induce multiple equilibrium outcomes (see for example Cella et al. (2015)). For exam-
ple, parliamentary systems outcomes may differ depending on whether the confidence
vote is mostly used as a threat or whether it effectively replaces politicians. This refers
to the de facto behaviour of politicians that in turn depends on their (short- or long-
term) incentives structure. In this context, the confidence vote may affect government
duration given that a legislative defeat would lead to new elections that would replace
the executive and the legislative body with positive probability. On the contrary, in
presidential systems both bodies have fixed terms and government stability is not af-
fected by the working of the policy process.4 In other words, under presidentialism
politicians face undistorted incentives and vote according to policy preferences.
In particular, the literature identifies three channels through which the confidence
vote may affect the policy-making process in parliamentary systems. First of all, if
the confidence vote is actively used to replace politicians, it improves their expected
quality (selection effect, see Cella et al., 2015; Huber and Gallardo, 2008). If instead the
confidence vote acts as a threat, it may either reduce the distortions to the executive’s
behaviour (disciplining effect, see Cella et al., 2015; Huber, 1996), or induce the voting
cohesion in parliament (legislative cohesion, see Baron, 1998; Diermeier and Feddersen,
1998b; Diermeier and Vlaicu, 2011).
Cella et al. (2015) highlight this twofold nature of the confidence vote. They model
an executive and a legislative body in a parliamentary system where politicians may
face early elections if the parliament does not approve the executive’s proposed policy.
Politicians can be of two types, they either care about implementing the efficient policy
or they only care about being in office. The authors show that in such a setting two
equilibria may arise, depending on the parameters that describe politicians’ quality
(type distribution) and information. The confidence vote may act as a threat and
induce an office oriented executive to propose the efficient policy in order to prevent
early termination of the legislature. In the presence of this disciplining effect, stable
systems are characterised by a low level of inefficiency. Alternatively, the confidence
vote may be used in equilibrium to replace possibly bad politicians. As, on average,
office oriented politicians are replaced more often, the expected quality of the executive
improves. Hence the selection effect operates more efficiently in unstable systems in
which we should observe a better alignment of the executive’s and voters preferences.
In a model of parliamentary democracy, where the government controls the legisla-
4As noted by Diermeir and Vlaicu (2011, p.863): “Under presidentialism the policy process is driven
by short-term issue-by-issue incentives because there are only short-term consequences of an unsuc-
cessful proposal. In parliamentary systems, on the other hand, the failure of a policy proposal can
lead to a change in the composition of the governing coalition. This injects political incentives in
the policy process whereby coalition members consider both their short-term policy interests and
their long-term political interest”.
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tive agenda, Baron (1998) instead shows that government members may change policies
regarding government spending to preserve the government and may also seek support
from the minority in parliament. In other words, the legislative cohesion effect con-
tributes to the stability of parliamentary systems through the approval of a larger
fraction of policies aimed at keeping current politicians in power.
The existence of all these effects implies that parliamentary systems are more hetero-
geneous than presidential systems, as, depending on their underlying characteristics,
they may have a different response to the policy implementation process and a different
degree of stability even for a given set of constitutional rules. Moreover, stability and
policy response are theoretically correlated, therefore it is meaningful to use stability
as a proxy to refine the classification of parliamentary systems. The focus of our paper
is to exploit empirically this de facto heterogeneity.
Our model then moves from these considerations to investigate the complex mecha-
nisms that link constitutional features to economic outcomes. We compare the effects
that constitutional structures have on the policy-making process, adopting a partition
of parliamentary systems that takes into account their degree of stability. In partic-
ular, the disciplining effect would imply that the difference between presidential and
parliamentary structures should derive from unstable parliamentary systems. Whereas,
both legislative cohesion and selection effects would induce stable systems to be those
that differ more from presidential systems. Hence our approach will allow a better
understanding not only of the existence of the link between institutions and policies
but also of the underlying mechanisms that generate it.
3 Empirical strategy
We start by replicating the standard empirical setting for ease of comparison with the
previous literature. Then, we introduce some modifications to handle the identification
issue. Here we present the datasets and the empirical specifications.
3.1 Data
Data are taken from three main sources. We start with the same dataset as in Pers-
son and Tabellini (2003) (PT). The dataset includes economic and social indicators
for 85 countries.5 The main dependent variables are central government expenditure
(cgexp) and central government revenues (cgrev). These variables are computed as a
5Countries are classified as follows: OECD (oecd); Central, Latin America and Caribbeans (laam);
Africa (africa); South and Central Asia (asiae). There is a prevalence of OECD and LAAM countries
that jointly represent the 60% of the sample. For a detailed list of variables and sources, see Persson
and Tabellini (2003).
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percentage of the GDP and are averaged between 1990 and 1998.6 The set of covariates
includes indicators for the continental location and colonial history that always enter
the regression equations,7 dummies for the origin of the constitution,8 age of democ-
racy (age), distance from equator (lat01 ), percentage of people having either English or
other European languages as their native language (engfrac and eurfrac, respectively),
democracy level (gastil), per-capita income (lyp), proportion of people between the age
15-64 (prop1564 ) and over 65 (prop65 ), population size (lpop) and a dummy indicating
a federal system (federal).
We then extend the dataset (to obtain what we call the BCIM dataset) to 116 coun-
tries, using data from Blume et al. (2009), thus updating the following variables: output
per worker (logyl) from 1988 in the PT dataset to 2000 and the perception of corruption
(cpi) from 1995-2000 to 2000-2005. We include data on additional dependent variables
to provide robustness checks: social protection as a percentage of the GDP (socprot)
for the period 1995-2012 and expenditure on education as a percentage of the GDP
(edspend) for the period 1995-2012.9 We also consider the executive’s ideological posi-
tion (right left), and the district magnitude (magn) to perform additional robustness
checks in Section 4.2.10
Finally, in order to partition parliamentary countries according to the stability distri-
bution, we create several stability indexes from a set of political indicators drawn from
the World Bank Database of Political Institutions (DPI, 2012). The dataset covers the
period 1975-2012. Our main indicator is gov life, defined as follows:
gov life =
∑
iDi/
∑
iEi
Li
, (1)
where Di represents the number of years a government has been in office between two
elections, Ei is a dummy which indicates elections, and Li, is the legal length of any
electoral term according to country-specific constitutional rules.11 Thus, gov life is
the average length of any electoral cycle computed for each country i, normalized by
the legal length of the electoral cycle. The index ranges from zero to one, with higher
6Other possible dependent variables included in the PT dataset are central government expenditure
on social services and welfare as a percentage of the GDP (ssw), log of the output per worker (logyl)
and the perception of corruption (cpi).
7The continental location variables are reported in Footnote 5. As for the colonial history, variables
include: col espa if a country is a former colony of Spain or Portugal; col uka if a country is
a former English colony and col otha if a country is a former colony of a country other than
England, Spain and Portugal. All the variables are weighted for the years of independence as
follows: col uka = col uk ∗ (250 − t indep)/250, where col uk = 1 is a dummy indicating a former
English colony, t indep ∈ [0, 250] is the years of independence and 250 is used as the standard value
for all non-colonized countries. The same exercise holds for col espa and col otha.
8The variables con20, con2150, con5180, respectively dating the constitution’s origin before 1920,
between 1921-1950, and between 1951-1980.
9Sources: IMF/GFS Yearbook.
10Source: DPI, 2012.
11The index gov life is built using the indicator yrcurnt from the DPI dataset which is coded zero in
the election year, and Xi − 1 in the year after the election.
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values corresponding to higher stability.
We classify parliamentary countries in parl stab if their value of gov life is above
the median of the stability distribution, and parl unstab if their value of gov life is
below the median.12 We introduce separate measures of stability in Section 4.2 for the
robustness checks. Table 6 in the Appendix reports some descriptive statistics.
3.2 Model
We first replicate results by Persson and Tabellini (2003) and Blume et al. (2009),
considering the effects of a twofold classification of countries in presidential and parlia-
mentary systems, according to the legal existence of the confidence vote. The empirical
equation is estimated through OLS:
Yi = α+ β1pres i + γmaj i + δXi + εi, (2)
where Xi is the set of observable country-specific covariates, and εi is the error term
which is assumed to be normally distributed.
Then, following the categorization of parliamentary systems in terms of stability,
we introduce our finer classification of countries, that further partitions parliamentary
systems into stable and unstable systems. We apply the dummy coding technique to
account for the heterogeneity in the subgroup of parliamentary systems, thus generating
three categories: pres, parl stab and parl unstab. We estimate the model with the
following multiple regression:
Yi = α+ β2parlstabi + β3parlunstabi + γmaj i + δXi + εi, (3)
where pres is the baseline category that represents the control group in our setting. We
are interested in testing whether presidential systems differ from stable parliamentary
systems (β2 6= 0), whether presidential systems differ from unstable parliamentary
systems (β3 6= 0) and whether stable and unstable parliamentary systems differ from
each other (β2 6= β3).
Finally, we re-estimate the model using the instrumental variable (IV) strategy. We
do so because we acknowledge that the choice of a constitution may be an equilibrium
outcome therefore determined by the agents’ preferences. In other words, variables
may exist that simultaneously affect both the choice of constitution and the dependent
variable, thus potentially biasing the OLS coefficients due to an omitted variable prob-
12More precisely, first we drop three countries which are within 0.05 points from the median of the
stability distribution in order to avoid a random assignment of countries due to measurement errors.
Note results hold even when we make the threshold move along the stability distribution. In detail,
the results remain significant until stable parliamentary countries are in the 75th percentile of the
stability distribution. After that, results are no longer significant. This is consistent with the
disciplining effect discussed in Section 2 according to which fully stable parliamentary countries
should not be significantly different from any other constitutional category.
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lem.13 In order to address this issue, we simultaneously estimate a nonlinear system
of equations by a maximum likelihood estimator. The instrumenting equation (4) is a
multinomial probit model where the constitutional categories are regressed over a set
of instruments and additional controls. The headline equation (5) follows the same
structure as equation (3):
Pc(j) = Prob[Uj > Uκ;κ ∈ C, κ 6= j], K = 0, 1, 2
Uij = ζjXi + ϕZi + ηij ; (4)
Yi = α+ β2parlstabi + β3parlunstabi + γmaj i + δXi + εi. (5)
We jointly estimate equations (4) and (5) to allow error terms (ηij , εi) to be correlated,
thus taking into account the full covariance structure of the model (Roodman, 2011).14
Equation (4) defines the choice probability of a given constitutional alternative j from
the choice set C containing K elements, where K = 0, 1, 2 represent the presidential
system, the unstable parliamentary system and the stable parliamentary system, re-
spectively. Such probability depends on the relative utility that country i obtains from
adopting the constitutional type j instead of a different constitutional type, where Xi
is the same set of covariates that enter equation (5), and Zi is the vector of instru-
ments. The error term ηij is assumed to have multivariate normal distribution and is
not necessarily independent across choices.
The instrumental variables are chosen to ensure the exclusion restriction, that some of
the variables entering equation (4) have no direct effect on the policy outcome, but the
effect on the constitutional choice, once we control for other regressors Cov(Zi, εi | Xi =
0). As noted by Persson and Tabellini (2003), the exclusion restriction is guaranteed by
three variables, i.e. con2150, con5180 and con81, respectively dating the adoption of a
constitution before 1920, between 1921-1950, and between 1951-1980. These variables
may be used as instruments as they are clearly exogenous to recent policy outcomes
but correlated with the constitutional choice, as historically there have been waves
of adoptions of specific types of constitution. However, the predictive power of the
constitutional dating variables is somewhat weak.15 Thus, Persson and Tabellini include
three more instruments in the first-stage estimation: the fraction of the population
speaking major European languages as their native language (engfrac, eurfrac), and
the distance from the equator (lat01 ). These variables are proxies for the European
13The identifying assumption in equations (2) and (3) is that, conditional on the vector of controls, the
type of constitution and the error term are orthogonal. If this is not true, then the OLS estimator
is no longer consistent. See Acemoglu (2005) for a detailed discussion.
14We estimate a likelihood function with more components, one for the linear equation and N-1 for the
multinomial equation, where N is the number of options. This method is more efficient than the
traditional two step procedure proposed by Heckman (1979) even in the case of weak instruments
(Perez and Sanz, 2005).
15Nonetheless, the F-test of the joint significance of these three variables significantly rejects the null
hypothesis. See Table 7 in the Appendix.
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influence on the constitutional decision, following the argument of Hall and Jones (1999)
who suggest that the extent to which countries have been influenced by Europe has a
considerable impact on the quality and type of institutions. The language predictor and
latitude are indeed highly correlated with the form of government, but their validity as
instruments has been widely questioned in the literature (see Acemoglu, 2005; Rockey,
2012), and by Persson and Tabellini themselves.16 To account for this, we include the
Hall-Jones instruments as covariates both in the instrumenting equation and in the
headline regression.
Finally, we introduce an additional instrument to improve the identification strat-
egy. This instrument, which we label confl mean, is defined as the proportion of years
a country has been involved in internal and external violent political activities between
years 1816 and 1900, thus representing the country-level degree of social and political
conflict during the XIX century.17 The index confl mean may significantly affect the
probability of a country falling into a particular constitutional category. Indeed, the
degree of conflict may strongly impact the choice of the constitutional system itself:
high values of the index may indicate deeply divided societies in which political deci-
sion making needs to rely on power-sharing rules. Parliamentary systems offer the ideal
environment for a broad power-sharing executive, given that the cabinet is a collegial
decision-making body (Lijphart, 2004). On the contrary, presidential systems intro-
duce rules that favour a winner-takes-all outcome, also by facilitating the adoption
of a majoritarian electoral rule (Linz, 1994). As additional evidence in favour of this
correlation, Jung and Deering (2015) show that unstable conditions at the time of the
constitutional choice increase the likelihood of the adoption of a parliamentary system.
This effect should be slightly bigger in the case of unstable parliamentary systems given
that the degree of stability of a country’s political environment may be persistent, i.e.
a more unstable environment is more likely to arise in the presence of past political
instability (Alesina et al., 1996). Therefore, we argue that the new instrument has a
robust predictive power for the endogenous regressor, i.e. the constitutional choice, and
it is orthogonal to the error term of the headline equation, given the time span elapsed
between the instrument and the dependent variable.18
16“We think that [...] the three constitutional dating variables [...] are uncorrelated with the remain-
ing unobserved determinants of fiscal policy, while we are less certain about the remaining instru-
ments [i.e. the language variables and the latitude]. Assuming that the first three instruments
are valid, the validity of the remaining [instruments] can be tested via the implied overidentifying
restrictions.”(Persson and Tabellini, 2004, p. 37). However, the overidentifying restriction is not
convincing given the low predictive power of the constitutional timing variables. Thus, as noted by
Acemoglu (2005, p.1041), “there are good reasons to suspect that they may not be excludable from
the regression of interest.”
17Source: Correlates of War Project. The index is computed as the sum of the years between 1816-1900
a country has been involved in violent conflicts over the reference period. Violent conflicts include
both intra and inter state conflicts. For a detailed review of the definition and categorization of
conflicts, see Sarkees (2010).
18Results from the instrumenting equations are reported in the Appendix, Table 7.
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4 Results
We start our empirical analysis by comparing our new framework with the standard
analysis by Persson and Tabellini (2003) and Blume et al. (2009). We first run re-
gressions (2) and (3) on the PT dataset using central government expenditure and
central government revenues as dependent variables (Table 1). A look at Column (1)
and (3) reminds us of the standard results in the literature, namely that presidential
systems spend systematically less than parliamentary ones, regardless of the chosen
measure of the government size. In Table 1, Column (2) and (4) show that the differ-
Table 1: Constitutions, Central Government Expenditure and Central Government Revenues. OLS
estimations. PT dataset
Dep.Var. cgexp cgexp cgrev cgrev
(1) (2) (3) (4)
pres −5.181∗∗∗ −5.001∗∗
(1.93) (2.02)
parl stab 6.298∗∗∗ 7.541∗∗∗
(2.28) (3.20)
parl unstab 1.383 −0.104
(1.87) (1.05)
F-test 6.97∗∗ 10.82∗∗∗
Observations 80 80 76 76
Adjusted R2 0.631 0.643 0.586 0.640
Notes: White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses. All the regressions include
the following controls: age, lyp, trade, prop1564, prop65, gastil, federal, oecd, lpop, africa, asiae, laam,
col uka, col espa, col otha. F-test (columns (2), (4)) refers to the hypothesis that the coefficients for
parl stab and parl unstab are equal (β2 = β3).∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
ence between constitutional systems is driven by the subgroup of stable parliamentary
countries. Indeed β2 is statistically significant in both columns and seems slightly larger
in magnitude when compared to previous results. Coefficient β3 is never significantly
different from zero so we cannot reject the hypothesis that unstable parliamentary
systems behave like presidential systems.
If we test whether parliamentary countries can be treated as an homogeneous group
(β2 = β3), we find that we can always reject the null hypothesis (p-values are 0.013
and 0.002, respectively).
We then run the same set of regressions on the extended BCIM dataset to check the
robustness of our approach (Table 2). As shown by Blume et al. (2009) and reported
in Column (1) and (4) the difference between constitutional systems in the traditional
classification is no longer significant, even though the coefficients retain the same sign.
The significancy of the coefficients of the finer partition is instead preserved. Columns
(2) and (5) show that β2 is still significantly different from zero, that β3 is not signifi-
cantly different from zero and that we can reject the hypothesis that β2 = β3 (p-values
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Table 2: Constitutions, Central Government Expenditure, Central Government Revenues. OLS esti-
mations. BCIM dataset
Dep.Var. cgexp cgexp cgexp cgrev cgrev cgrev
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
pres −3.755 −2.701
(2.42) (2.36)
parl stab 5.206∗∗ 5.128∗∗ 6.882∗∗∗ 6.929∗∗∗
(2.11) (2.18) (2.32) (2.49)
parl unstab 1.734 1.442 0.302 0.052
(1.98) (1.96) (1.95) (1.96)
PPI 4.486 5.186
(4.92) (5.02)
F-test 2.30∗∗ 2.92∗∗ 9.82∗∗∗ 6.74∗∗∗
Observations 91 89 82 87 85 82
Adjusted R2 0.67 0.69 0.70 0.66 0.71 0.73
Notes: White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include the
following controls: age, lyp, trade, prop1564, prop65, gastil, federal, oecd, lpop, africa, asiae, laam,
col uka, col espa, col otha. F-test (columns (2)-(3) and (5)-(6)) refers to the hypothesis that the coeffi-
cients for parl stab and parl unstab are equal (β2 = β3).∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
are 0.0495 and 0.009, respectively). In other words extending the dataset does not
change any of the empirical facts observed in the original dataset, thus suggesting that
not treating parliamentary systems as a homogeneous group is a modelling improve-
ment.
Our partition of parliamentary systems is based on the observed behaviour of the
country and not on the details of the constitutional rules. We argued in Section 2
that we intend to capture the heterogeneity generated by the different equilibria that
may arise in a given constitutional setup. To further validate this interpretation of the
results we include the Parliamentary Power Index (PPI) proposed by Fish and Kroenig
(2009) as an additional control. This index reports the strength of the legislative body
by measuring the fraction of “powers” that the national legislature held out of 32
listed ones in 2007. The introduction of PPI as a regressor allows us to control for
differences in the constitutional features of parliamentary countries. Columns (3) and
(6) show that results do not change when we include the index, thus supporting our
interpretation.
Finally, we replicate the analysis but adopting the IV approach as described in Section
3.2 both on the PT dataset (Table 3) and on the BCIM dataset (Table 4). Columns
(2) and (4) of both tables show that the empirical findings are confirmed even when
we instrument the possibly endogenous constitutional decision, further supporting our
modelling choice.
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Table 3: Constitutions, Central Government Expenditure and Central Government Revenues. IV
estimations. PT dataset
Dep.Var. cgexp cgexp cgrev cgrev
(1) (2) (3) (4)
pres −6.51∗ −6.47∗
(3.16) (3.72)
parl stab 5.774∗∗ 6.231∗∗
(2.92) (2.29)
parl unstab 1.346 0.571
(1.20) (1.36)
F-test 2.97∗∗ 9.82∗∗∗
Headline covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 83 82 82 81
Adjusted R2 0.68 0.68 0.67 0.66
Notes: White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses. The IV approach follows
the strategy presented in Section 3.2. In Columns (1) and (3), the instrumenting equation is estimated
using a probit model. In Columns (2) and (4), the instrumenting equation is a multinomial probit
model. Results from the instrumenting equations are reported in the Appendix, Table 7. Columns
(1)-(4) include the following controls: engfrac, eurfrac, lat01, age, lyp, trade, prop1564, prop65, gastil,
maj, federal, lpop, oecd. F-test (columns (2) and (4)) refers to the hypothesis that the coefficients for
parl stab and parl unstab are equal (β2 = β3).∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 4: Constitutions, Central Government Expenditure and Central Government Revenues. IV
estimations. BCIM dataset
Dep.Var. cgexp cgexp cgrev cgrev
(1) (2) (3) (4)
pres −3.29 −4.38
(3.91) (3.93)
parl stab 5.702∗∗ 7.243∗∗∗
(2.23) (2.75)
parl unstab 1.981 2.185
(1.63) (2.16)
F-test 2.85∗∗ 6.42∗∗∗
Headline covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 100 86 99 86
Adjusted R2 0.59 0.61 0.60 0.63
Notes: White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses. The IV approach follows
the strategy presented in Section 3.2. In Columns (1) and (3), the instrumenting equation is estimated
using a probit model. In Columns (2) and (4), the instrumenting equation is a multinomial probit
model. Results from the instrumenting equations are reported in the Appendix, Table 7. Columns
(1)-(4) include the following controls: engfrac, eurfrac, lat01, age, lyp, trade, prop1564, prop65, gastil,
maj, federal, lpop, oecd. F-test (columns (2) and (4)) refers to the hypothesis that the coefficients for
parl stab and parl unstab are equal (β2 = β3).∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
12
4.1 Robustness checks and possible transmission channels
We perform several robustness checks to test the validity of the results. First of all, we
test the model on dependent variables different from those analysed so far: output per
worker, the perception of corruption, social protection expenditure as a percentage of
the GDP and expenditure on education as a percentage of the GDP. We run regressions
(2) and (3) on both the original and enlarged datasets. The change in dependent
variables does not alter our results (Tables 8-11 in the Appendix).
We then estimate the model including the executive’s ideological position and the
district magnitude as additional regressors. The underlying idea is that a leftist ex-
ecutive should implement higher public expenditure and that district magnitude may
have a positive impact on the size of fiscal policies (Milesi-Ferretti et al., 2002). Table
12 in the Appendix shows that results do not change.
A third set of robustness checks is performed on the partition of parliamentary coun-
tries in stable and unstable countries, as this partition is the distinguishing feature of
the empirical strategy. In the main analysis countries are partitioned according to the
index gov life. We consider three alternative stability indexes: gov end, defined as the
fraction of governments that are successful in reaching the legal term of the mandate;19
year exec, defined as the average tenure of the head of the executive weighted by the
legal length of any electoral term;20 year party, defined as the average number of years
the governing party has been in office weighted by the legal length of the electoral
term.21 Results reported in Table 13 of the Appendix show that the empirical findings
are not sensitive to the choice of stability index.
A further concern is related to the possible reverse causality between stability and
policy outcomes. Indeed, public expenditure may be increased by the government in
order to remain in power, thus increasing stability. As a robustness check we classify
parliamentary countries as stable and unstable countries based on the index gov life
in the time interval 1975-1989 (instead of 1975-2012). In this way, the dependent
variables (which are averages of the expenditure/revenues in the period 1990-1998)
cannot have a direct effect on the classification. Results are reported in Table 5. The
sign and magnitude of the coefficients in Table 2 and Table 5 support the validity of
our approach.
19The index is built using the indicator yrcurnt from the DPI dataset. Higher values of the index
correspond to higher stability.
20This index is built using the indicator yearoff from the DPI dataset, which collects information
about the number of years the head of the executive has been in office. Higher values of the index
correspond to higher stability. Note that this index may provide different results from the previous
ones, since it keeps counting the number of years a government has been in power even if an election
occurs, if the incumbent government wins the election.
21This index is built using the indicator prtyin from the DPI dataset, which counts the number of
years the chief executive party has been in office. Higher values of the index correspond to higher
stability. Note that the index accounts for the possibility that a single party remains in power for
a large number of years
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Table 5: Constitutions, Central Government Expenditure and Central Government Revenues. OLS
estimations. BCIM dataset
Dep.Var. cgexp cgrev
(1) (2)
parl stab 6.201∗∗ 6.403∗∗
(2.87) (3.05)
parl unstab 1.26 0.646
(1.66) (2.49)
F-test 3.43∗ 5.51∗∗
Observations 89 82
Adjusted R2 0.735 0.708
Notes: White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses. All the regressions include
the following controls: age, lyp, trade, prop1564, prop65, gastil, federal, oecd, lpop, africa, asiae, laam,
col uka, col espa, col otha. F-test refers to the hypothesis that the coefficients for parl stab and parl
unstab are equal (β1 = β2).∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
The overall empirical analysis is consistent with the theoretical intuitions stated in
Section 2. In particular in a model such as in Cella et al. (2015), the performance
of parliamentary systems closely approaches the performance of presidential systems if
the confidence vote entails a better ability of legislators to reject bad policy proposals
and thus a more unstable political environment. However, if the selection effect is not
effective then the de facto behaviour of politicians will be driven by political incentives.
This mechanism not only drives stable parliamentary systems away from the perfor-
mance of presidential systems, but also from unstable parliamentary systems. The same
effect is consistent with the presence of the legislative cohesion effect in models such
as in Baron (1998), according to which the executive and the parliament coordinate to
keep politicians in power and to avoid a no confidence motion. Coordination indeed
leads either the executive to formulate policy proposals that please the majority of the
veto-players or legislators to accept a larger fraction of executive’s proposals to avoid
early elections.
To better understand the mechanisms behind these two effects we focus on the in-
teraction between stability and quality of the institutions in parliamentary systems.
Theoretically both effects should be milder in countries with better institutions. The
low frequency of politician’s replacement may in fact depend on a higher expected qual-
ity of actors in the political arena which makes stability the optimal choice. On the
other hand, strong institutions may deter legislative cohesion even among low qual-
ity politicians. In both cases we expect the difference between stable parliamentary
systems and other groups to decrease in the quality of institutions. We empirically
investigate this relation by introducing the Government Effectiveness index (goveff )
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and its interactions.22 Results in Table 14 in the Appendix support this theoretical
conjecture.
The main findings described above do not find evidence in favour of the disciplining
effect that predicts a similar performance between presidential and stable parliamen-
tary systems. However, this may depend on the difficulty of empirically isolating the
subgroup of fully stable parliamentary countries. This leads us to suppose that the dif-
ference between presidential and parliamentary systems is not monotonically increasing
in the level of stability of the latter system. To test this insight, we try to further split
parliamentary countries into more than two categories according to their stability dis-
tribution. Indeed, even if the analysis is sensitive to the small number of countries
included in each category, we find that the difference between constitutional systems is
increasing in the stability of the parliamentary constitutional design, but it drops when
we consider fully stable parliamentary countries. Results are reported in the Appendix,
Table 15.
5 Conclusion
This paper analyses the effect of constitutional structures on policy outcomes with spe-
cific attention to the role of the confidence vote. In particular, the novelty of the paper
rests with the understanding of the link between government stability and economic
outcomes for parliamentary systems. Hence, the empirical analysis we perform intro-
duces finer partition of parliamentary countries according to their degree of stability.
We find that stable parliamentary systems behave differently from both presidential and
unstable parliamentary systems with respect to every dependent variable we consider.
We also provide some novel insights into the transmission channels that may generate
our empirical results. When the executive is disciplined by the threat of the confidence
vote (disciplining effect), then it will always formulate congruent policy proposals.
In this case, the confidence vote is never actively used and the performance of fully
stable parliamentary systems and presidential systems will tend to coincide. Indeed,
when the confidence vote is actively used by the parliament, then the difference in
performance between the two constitutional systems will be increasing in the stability
of the parliamentary system. That applies either when the majority of parliament is
office-motivated (selection effect) or when the executive and the parliament coordinate
to stay in office until the end of the term (legislative cohesion effect).
We also introduce a novel empirical approach by proposing a new instrument that
better predicts the constitutional choice of countries, thus tackling the problems of
endogeneity.
We therefore contribute to the growing body of literature of empirical constitutional
22The index is taken from the World Governance Indicators of the World Bank. We use the average
of available years (1996-2014).
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economics by dealing with some of the critiques of previous works in particular by
offering a method of analysis that generates results that are more robust and that shed
some light on the possible transmission channels.
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Appendix
Table 6: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Pres Parl Unstab Parl Stab p(1,2) p(1,3) p(2,3) p(pt,bcim)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
CGEXP 22.9 32.1 32.5 0.00 0.00 0.32 0.43
CGREV 20.7 27.6 30.7 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.91
SOCPROT 4.84 7.89 7.45 0.00 0.02 0.60 -
LYP 7.88 8.53 8.77 0.01 0.00 0.31 0.22
TRADE 68.8 79.5 92.5 0.27 0.05 0.31 0.05
GASTIL 2.92 2.49 2.12 0.09 0.07 0.08 0.06
PROP65 5.83 9.78 8.87 0.00 0.01 0.95 0.11
AGE 0.14 0.21 0.23 0.16 0.08 0.97 0.00
OECD 0.05 0.34 0.36 0.00 0.00 0.98 0.08
AFRICA 0.20 0.17 0.08 0.78 0.14 0.15 0.39
ASIA 0.10 0.14 0.21 0.63 0.19 0.58 0.08
LAAM 0.52 0.07 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.89
PPI 0.49 0.66 0.67 0.00 0.00 0.73 0.89
Notes: Entries in columns (1), (2) and (3) are mean values for constitutional categories when using the BCIM
extended dataset. p(x,y) is the probability of falsely rejecting equal means across groups corresponding to
columns x and y, under the assumption of equal variances. Column (7) is the probability of falsely rejecting
equal means across the original PT dataset and the BCIM extended dataset, under the assumption of equal
variances.
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Table 7: IV instrumenting equations. BCIM dataset
Model Probit Multinomial (base=pres)
Dep-Var. pres stable unstable
(1) (2) (3)
confl mean −1.71∗∗∗ 0.65∗∗ 0.87∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.30) (0.41)
con2150 −0.003 −0.24 0.28
(0.08) (0.21) (0.23)
con5180 0.37∗∗ −0.79∗∗∗ 0.27
(0.09) (0.27) (0.23)
con81 0.78∗∗∗ −0.97∗∗∗ −0.03
(0.13) (0.33) (0.26)
engfrac −0.46∗∗ 0.27 0.28
(0.16) (0.21) (0.23)
eurfrac 0.82∗∗∗ −0.46∗∗∗ −0.49∗∗∗
(0.15) (0.18) (0.23)
lat01 −0.87∗∗ 0.89∗ 0.02
(0.39) (0.48) (0.51)
age 1.14∗∗∗ −2.03∗∗∗ −0.49∗
(0.29) (0.67) (0.43)
F-TEST on confl mean 13.6∗∗∗
F-TEST on constitution variables 21.4∗∗∗ 28.98∗∗∗ 27.39∗∗∗
Observations 83 80 80
Adjusted R2 0.735
Notes: White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses. We estimate Column (1)
using a probit model and Columns (2) and (3) using a multinomial probit. Entries are average marginal
effects. All columns include (but do not report) the following controls: maj, gastil, lyp, lpop, trade,
prop1564, prop65, federal, oecd. F-test on confl mean refers to the joint significance of confl mean in
the stable and unstable categories. F-test on constitution variables refers to the joint significance of
the constitution dating variables, i.e. con2150, con5180, con81.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 8: Constitutions and Output per Worker. OLS estimations.
Dataset PT BCIM
Dep.Var. logyl logyl logyl logyl
(1) (2) (3) (4)
pres −0.294∗ −0.157
(1.84) (1.01)
parl stab 0.325∗ 0.392∗∗
(1.78) (2.04)
parl unstab 0.115 −0.0364
(1.55) (2.20)
Observations 74 73 84 83
Adjusted R2 0.731 0.695 0.753 0.721
Notes: White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses. logyl is the productivity
level as in Persson and Tabellini (2003) (Columns (1) and (2)), and in Blume et al. (2009) (Columns
(3) and (4)). The regressions include the following controls: age, lyp, trade, gastil, federal, oecd, lpop,
africa, asiae, laam, col uka, col espa, col otha, avelf, prot80, catho80, confu.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 9: Constitutions and Perception of corruption. OLS estimations.
Dataset PT BCIM
Dep.Var. cpi cpi cpi cpi
(1) (2) (3) (4)
pres −0.620∗ −0.326
(1.76) (−1.05)
parl stab 0.627∗ 0.559∗
(1.80) (1.72)
parl unstab 0.491 0.362
(1.40) (1.19)
avelf 1.274∗∗ 1.567∗∗ 0.987∗ 1.432∗∗
(2.09) (2.42) (1.83) (2.49)
Observations 78 78 88 88
Adjusted R2 0.829 0.833 0.806 0.820
Notes: White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses. cpi is the perception of
corruption as in Persson and Tabellini (2003) (Columns (1) and (2)), and in Blume et al. (2009)
(Columns (3) and (4)). The regressions include: age, lyp, trade, gastil, federal, oecd, lpop, africa,
asiae, laam, col uka, col espa, col otha, avelf, prot80, catho80, confu. The addtional control avelf is
included and reported in the table. avelf is the index of ethnolinguistic fractionalization, as in La
Porta et al. (1998).
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 10: Constitutions and Social Protection. OLS estimations.
Dataset PT BCIM
Dep.Var. socprot socprot socprot socprot
(1) (2) (3) (4)
pres −2.184 −2.028
(2.10) (2.01)
parl stab 2.924∗∗ 2.149∗∗
(2.05) (1.09)
parl unstab −0.346 0.270
(2.16) (1.71)
Observations 76 76 86 86
Adjusted R2 0.758 0.761 0.714 0.729
Notes: White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses. socprot is the central
government social protection expenditure as defined by the IMF-GFS dataset (averaged over years
1995-2012). The regressions include the following controls: age, lyp, trade, prop1564, prop65, gastil,
federal, oecd, lpop, africa, asiae, laam, col uka, col espa, col otha.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 11: Constitutions and Education Expenditure. OLS estimations.
Dataset PT BCIM
Dep.Var. edspend edspend edspend edspend
(1) (2) (3) (4)
pres −0.413 −0.512
(1.10) (1.16)
parl stab 0.832∗∗ 1.10∗∗
(0.65) (0.89)
parl unstab 0.346 0.270
(1.16) (1.71)
Observations 75 75 84 84
Adjusted R2 0.508 0.521 0.514 0.529
Notes: White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses. edspend is the cen-
tral government expenditure on education as percentage of the GDP as defined by the IMF-GFS
(averaged over years 1995-2012). The regressions include the following controls: age, lyp, trade,
prop1564, prop65, gastil, federal, oecd, lpop, africa, asiae, laam, col uka, col espa, col otha.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 12: Constitutions, Central Government Expenditure, District Magnitude and Ideology. OLS
Estimations. PT and BCIM dataset.
Dataset PT BCIM
Dep.Var. cgexp cgexp cgexp cgexp
(1) (2) (3) (4)
pres −3.327 −2.641
(1.54) (2.05)
parl stab 5.543∗∗ 4.502∗∗
(2.26) (2.30)
parl unstab −0.0559 1.484
(2.03) (1.64)
right left 1.266 0.970 1.968 2.055
(1.94) (1.72) (1.39) (1.48)
magn −0.228 −0.271 −0.333 −0.354
(0.24) (0.24) (0.27) (0.27)
Observations 75 75 85 85
Adjusted R2 0.671 0.692 0.628 0.645
Notes: White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses. The regressions include:
age, lyp, trade, prop1564, prop65, gastil, federal, oecd, lpop, africa, asiae, laam, col uka, col espa,
col otha. The addition controls right left and magn are included. right left reports the average
ideological position of the executive from 1970 to 2012. Values are between 1 - right-oriented executive
- to 3 - left-oriented executive. magn represents the district magnitude weighted by the country’s
population. Source: DPI dataset.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
21
Table 13: Robustness checks with different stability indexes. OLS estimations
Dep.Var. cgexp cgexp cgexp cgexp
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dataset PT
parl stab 6.298∗∗∗ 5.932∗∗ 5.816∗∗∗ 6.064∗∗
(1.93) (2.62) (2.78) (2.03)
parl unstab 1.383 −0.316 2.560 1.852
(1.87) (2.57) (1.63) (1.94)
Dataset BCIM
parl stab 5.206∗∗ 4.510∗∗ 4.656∗ 4.590∗∗
(2.11) (2.08) (1.98) (2.17)
parl unstab 1.734 −1.700 2.522 2.827
(1.98) (1.81) (2.07) (1.50)
Notes: White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses. A detailed explanation
of the way in which the stability indexes have been assembled is reported in Section 4.2. Columns
(1), (2), (3) and (4) report the stability indexes gov life, gov end, year exec, year party, respectively.
The regressions include the following controls: age, lyp, trade, prop1564, prop65, gastil, federal,
oecd, lpop, africa, asiae, laam, col uka, col espa, col otha.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 14: Constitutions, Central Government Expenditure and Central Government Revenues with WGI
effects. OLS estimations. BCIM dataset
Dep.Var. cgexp cgexp cgrev cgrev
(1) (2) (3) (4)
parl stab 5.101∗∗ 6.833∗∗∗ 5.487∗∗ 8.026∗∗∗
(2.11) (2.43) (2.39) (3.08)
parl unstab 1.772 1.329 0.524 0.342
(1.98) (2.28) (1.97) (2.10)
goveff −3.490∗ −2.539 −0.251 −0.098
(1.96) (2.25) (1.76) (1.19)
parl stab∗goveff −3.139∗ −2.502∗
(1.80) (1.84)
parl unstab∗goveff 0.367 0.132
(2.41) (2.42)
Observations 89 89 85 85
Adjusted R2 0.692 0.695 0.693 0.705
Notes: White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses. All the regressions include the
following controls: maj, age, lyp, trade, prop1564, prop65, gastil, federal, oecd, lpop, africa, asiae, laam,
col uka, col espa, col otha. goveff is the Government Effectiveness index and it is computed as the average
of available years: 1996-2014.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 15: Constitutions and Central Government Expenditure. OLS estimations. BCIM dataset
Dep.Var. cgexp cgexp
(1) (2)
parl stab 1 2.67 1.96
(3.01) (2.93)
parl stab 2 4.91∗∗ 2.24
(2.60) (2.83)
parl stab 3 3.53 5.31∗∗
(3.01) (2.99)
parl stab 4 3.26
(3.33)
Observations 91 87
Adjusted R2 0.67 0.71
Notes: White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses. Parliamentary countries
are split into 3 categories (columns (1)) and 4 categories (columns (2)) according to the index gov
life. Note that in this specification parl stab(0)=pres. The regressions include the following controls:
age, lyp, trade, prop1564, prop65, gastil, federal, oecd, lpop, africa, asiae, laam, col uka, col espa,
col otha.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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